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The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is important in processing
rewards and other behavioral outcomes. Here, we review from
a computational perspective recent progress in understanding
this complex function. OFC neurons appear to represent
abstract outcome values, which may facilitate the comparison
of options, as well as concrete outcome attributes, such as
flavor or location, which may enable predictive cues to access
current outcome values in the face of dynamic modulation by
internal state, context and learning. OFC can use reinforcement
learning to generate outcome predictions; it can also generate
outcome predictions using other mechanisms, including the
evaluation of decision confidence or uncertainty. OFC neurons
encode not only the mean expected outcome but also the
variance, consistent with the idea that OFC uses a probabilistic
population code to represent outcomes. We suggest that
further attention to the nature of its representations and
algorithms will be critical to further elucidating OFC function.
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Introduction
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) was initially character-
ized as an area whose destruction profoundly impacted
human personality, but, paradoxically, left no obvious
deficits in standard cognitive tests (reviewed in [1]).
Yet, through intensifying scrutiny over the last decade
the function of the OFC has arisen from obscurity to
take a central place in our understanding of learning
and decision-making [2,3]. Today, through a remark-
able convergence of studies conducted in species ran-
ging from rats to humans, OFC is widely conceived as a
place where the ‘value’ of things is represented in the
brain.Please cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
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central role in most behavioral theories of decision-
making. In neuroeconomic theory, assignment of
economic value allows qualitatively different goods to
be compared in a single ‘universal currency ’ [4]. In
animal learning theory, the similar concept of ‘incentive
value’ measures the ability of outcomes to motivate
behavior [5,6]. In machine learning theory, ‘state
values’ and ‘action values’ are the principal targets of
learning and action selection; by maximizing these
values, agents learn optimal behavior [7]. By offering
formal (i.e. quantitative) definitions of value and related
concepts, these theoretical frameworks can help one to
test and eventually to understand more precisely what
the OFC does. That is because formal definitions can
yield concrete predictions that are testable using
traditional neurophysiological and behavioral measure-
ments without resorting to semantic arguments about
abstract terms [8].
While theoretical perspectives are helpful, they also
bring on more work. In the light of theory, questions
about OFC function become not only more clear but
also more detailed and nuanced, opening up and
demanding further experimental tests. Moreover, differ-
ent theoretical frameworks present partially overlap-
ping, sometimes incongruent, views that must
eventually be reconciled. Finally, applying theories of
behavior to the brain requires one to bridge the gap
between the functional level that forms the basis for the
theory and the level of neurophysiology. As famously
framed by David Marr [9], two key pieces are needed to
bridge between behavioral (computational) and neural
(implementational) levels: first, understanding the
nature of the neural code or representation; second,
understanding the processes or algorithms used to create
and utilize these representations.
This review will examine recent progress in OFC func-
tion in light of economic, psychological and compu-
tational theories of value. While we wholeheartedly
acknowledge the convergence of many threads evidence,
our main goal is to emphasize the ragged edges and
emerging complexities. These become apparent especi-
ally when asking what exactly a neural representation
within OFC might look like, and therefore our primary
focus will be on recordings from individual OFC neurons
in monkeys and rats, with secondary attention to lesions
and neuroimaging studies. We will also review what wecomes in the orbitofrontal cortex, Curr Opin Neurobiol (2009), doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.03.010
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Figure 1
Involvement of OFC in the generation of concrete outcome predictions.
Illustration of OFC neural representations underlying second-order
conditioning, based on experiments in rats that demonstrate that OFC is
required for generating predictions of specific rewarding outcomes but is
not required for abstract value predictions [28]. (a) During learning, a
neutral stimulus (e.g. cow manure, left) is associated by experience with
a rewarding outcome (a type of edible mushroom) which evokes a neural
representation of specific properties (appearance, smell, taste and
nutrient contents, represented by the drawing in the center) as well as an
abstract value (a positive value illustrated by a smiley face, right). (b) In
normal intact animals, after learning, exposure to the stimulus (left)
generates two types of predictions: those of the specific outcome
(center) and those of the abstract or motivational value (right). The dotted
arrows (i–iii) illustrate the associative links that underlie these
predictions. The specific predictions are generated directly by the
stimulus (i). The value predictions are generated both directly by the
stimulus (ii) and indirectly through the specific outcome (iii). (c) In animals
with OFC lesions, experiments demonstrate that the stimulus still
generates abstract value predictions, but fails to generate concrete
predictions of the specific outcome, as illustrated. These observations
suggest that the key role of OFC is the generation of specific concrete
outcome representations.UN
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know about the origin of these representations, and touch
upon the issue of how they are used.
Specific and abstract properties of neural
representations in OFC
OFC was identified in monkeys as an area containing
neurons that responded to ‘rewarding’ substances such as
palatable foods but whose activity was not tied directly to
their physical attributes: responses could be changed
dramatically by associative learning and by the current
hunger or satiety of the subject (reviewed by [10]). In this
sense, OFC responses reflected something ‘subjective’
about the value of a reward.
Amore precise operational definition of ‘subjective value’
can be phrased in terms of a decision-maker’s preferences
amongst different options: assuming that choices on
average maximize value, one can infer subjective values
from choice preferences [11]. This important idea was
tested by Padoa-Schioppa and Assad [12], who recorded
single neurons in the OFCwhile monkeys chose between
pairs of juices of different volumes and types. Remark-
ably, they found neurons whose firing rates were corre-
lated with the relative choice preferences of the animal.
Since the preference function combined both the
volumes and the types of juice, these response functions
were not a simple function of the sensory properties. Nor
were they dependent on direction or motor output used to
indicate a choice. Thus, OFC neurons can be said to
encode ‘abstract values’, as defined by choice preferences
[12].
Signals that correlate with an abstract value satisfy an
important need from a neuroeconomic perspective: they
provide a common currency for comparisons of unlike
goods [4]. But from a computational perspective, these
signals seem to raise as many questions as they answer. By
definition value is a single scalar variable and can be
represented in the firing rate of even a single neuron. So
what is all the rest of the ‘representational space’ of OFC
being used for? Or, to put it more simply, what are all
those neurons doing? Does value play a role like contrast
in the visual cortex, that is a parameter that modulates a
primary representation? If so, what is the primary repres-
entation? If, alternatively, value is the primary variable,
playing a role like spatial location in the primary visual
cortex or frequency in the auditory cortex, then what are
the other parameters that differentiate the functions of
different neurons?
Tellingly, a recent lesion study in rats [28] suggests that
the representation of the concrete properties of valuable
objects is not merely of secondary importance for OFC
function. This study used an intricate conditioning para-
digm based on behavior driven by second-order rewards –
things that are not themselves rewards but are associated
with reward (e.g. money). In this situation, the OFC wasPlease cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2009, 19:1–7necessary when predictions of the specific attributes of
the reward were utilized but not when only calculating
predicted value (Figure 1) However, as we discuss further
below, the same OFC neurons can respond both to food
items and to the omission of punishments such as electric
shocks [31]. More work is needed to define the range of
outcome types that might define the ‘receptive field’ of an
OFC neuron.
While deciphering the nature of OFC representations
merits further neurophysiological attention, some clues
can be gleaned from recent studies. Many attributes of
eaten foods, such as fat content, have been found tocomes in the orbitofrontal cortex, Curr Opin Neurobiol (2009), doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.03.010
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influence activity in OFC (reviewed in [10]). Indeed, in
the Padoa-Schioppa and Assad experiments, only one
fraction of OFC neurons correlated with abstract prefer-
ences; a second class reflected the ‘offer value’, of only
one or two of the juices, while a third class of OFC
neurons’ firing correlated with physical properties of
the juices, being insensitive to the amount [12,13].
The selectivity of OFC neurons for specific food proper-
ties suggests the possibility that representations in the
OFC might be organized according to categories, such as
reported in inferior temporal cortex [14] but perhaps
based on features such as the caloric and nutrient content
of foods.
Another possibility is that OFC representations might be
organized using a spatial coordinate system, as found in
the visual system, hippocampus, and throughout much of
the brain. Indeed, three recent studies indicate that
individual OFC neurons recorded in freely moving rats
indeed encode spatial locations [15,16] sometimes jointly
with value [17]. While OFC responses in monkeys have
been reported to be indifferent to the direction of eye
movements required to indicate a choice [12], a recent
study shows spatial selectivity does arise during the out-
come in a task that required monkeys to remember their
responses for choices in subsequent trials [58]. It is also
important to keep in mind that the brain uses many
different kinds of spatial reference frames. If the spatial
reference frame in OFC is an allocentric map – ‘world
centered’, similar to the one in the hippocampus – then
one might not expect to see spatial tuning in head-fixed
monkeys with small eye movement. Nonetheless, using
suitable manipulations this issue could be also tested in
monkeys (cf. [19]).
Finally, since the population of OFC neurons is appar-
ently heterogeneous, do cells with different kinds of
selectivity map onto different anatomical substrates? A
gradient of abstract to concrete properties from posterior
to anterior OFC has been suggested based on neuroima-
ging [20]. Could more ‘abstract’ cells that are closer to
choice preferences map onto a particular class of cells, for
example cortical projection neurons, while other cell
types correspond to local neurons? And how are neurons
with different functional properties connected as a local
network? Are more abstract responses being computed
locally by combining more specific ones?
Dynamic updating of values: context, needs
and learning
Central to the concept of values is that they can be
dynamically modulated even when the objects of value
themselves remain unchanged, and this is a property
reflected in OFC. An important example of such dynamic
modulation is how the value of a given option depends on
the menu of alternatives, called the ‘reference frame’. A
classic study showed that single neurons in monkey OFCPlease cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
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change their response to a given reward depending on the
relative value of an alternative reward [21]. This might
reflect scaling of OFC representations to fit the available
options, allowing neurons with a limited dynamic range of
firing rates to represent values over different ranges in
different situations.
However, a more recent study using similar methods
obtained exactly the opposite result, that the responses
of OFC neurons were independent of the alternatives or
‘menu’ of options [13]. This finding also has a rationale:
by keeping a single scale of values one can ensure
transitivity of preferences (i.e. if A > B, B > C, then
C > A), which is an essential trait for a rational decision
maker with consistent choice patterns. Moreover, keep-
ing a single scale avoids the combinatorial explosion of
comparisons whenmany alternatives are present. But how
could the discrepancy of these findings be resolved? One
possibility is that they are due to differences in method-
ology.While the first study repeated the same comparison
set for large blocks of trials, the second study interleaved
different comparison sets from trial-to-trial. Therefore,
the contradiction could be resolved by supposing that
reference frames change only on time scales longer than a
few trials [13].
However, a recent neuroimaging study showed menu-
sensitivity of the activation of human medial OFC using
an interleaved trial design [22], apparently contradicting
this explanation. This might suggest a second possible
explanation, that there is differentiation of function
within OFC, with some areas encoding a relatively local
reference frame and others a more global one. In any case,
it is worth considering that we have not yet gotten a good
handle on how subjects apply reference frames or perhaps
even how to frame the issue of reference frames [23,24].
A second, important way that values change is depending
on the internal state of the organism. Indeed, the OFC
appears to play a critical role in the modulation of valua-
tions by internal state. For example, hunger state modu-
lates the subjective value of food and also the firing rates
of OFC neurons [25]. This finding implies that the OFC
must combine information about the state of the organ-
ism’s needs with sensory information about the physical
attributes of available resources. How this occurs is a
critical question that deserves more attention. It is para-
mount that there is specificity of matching between
representations of needs and goods. For instance, hunger
signals should enhance the value of food representations
while thirst signals should enhance the value of water
representations. Such specificity of state-dependent
modulation would imply the existence of an attribute-
specific representational structure in OFC preceding the
computation of a purely abstract one. In fact, by recording
neuronal populations across feeding cycles in rats, de
Araujo and colleagues showed that the ensemble activitycomes in the orbitofrontal cortex, Curr Opin Neurobiol (2009), doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.03.010
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of OFC neurons can predict satiety-states [26]. It will be
fruitful to investigate to what degree of detail an organ-
ism’s needs are represented in OFC and how representa-
tions of needs combined with representations of goods.
The nature of the representational structure may influ-
ence how needs combine with rewards in other ways. For
instance, a spatial representation [15–17] could allow
dynamic updating of outcome values based on their
changing relative distance to the agent. In this way, when
deciding between two potential food sources, an animal
would be able to take distance into account when con-
sidering a very abundant food source that is far away from
its current location [27]. Such ‘spatial discounting’ would
be very much analogous to temporal discounting demon-
strated in OFC neurons (see below).
What are the components of value?
Value has a number of components and it is somewhat
controversial at this moment which ones are represented
together or separately in the OFC. First, values have a
positive and negative component: value = benefit  cost.
Human neuroimaging studies tend to indicate that
rewards and losses/punishments are processed in distinct
subregions of OFC, with lateral regions being more
modulated by costs and medial regions by benefits
[20,28,29]. However, the same neurons that respond to
rewards can also signal aversive electrical shocks [30].
A recent neuroimaging study [31] showed that part of
OFC correlated with ‘willingness to pay’, a concept
critical in economics that combines cost and benefit.
By contrast, lesion studies in rodents failed to implicate
the OFC in processing costs such as the effort of climbing
a wall [32,33] or in instrumental behaviors in general [34].
Therefore, it may be important to clarify the differences
in calculating and representing costs that reflect negative
outcomes, such as receipt of a punishment or a loss, from
costs that are associated with the action used to obtain the
outcome, such as energy expenditure or transaction costs.
Interestingly, a lesion study in monkeys [35] demon-
strated that OFC is required for reinforcement-guided
decision-making in tasks based on stimulus-outcome
associations, but not in tasks that depend on action-out-
come associations. Similarly, OFC lesions do not affect
valuation during instrumental conditioning in rats [34]. In
terms of reinforcement learning, this might reflect a
dissociation between a state-value system and an
action-value system, with OFC participating in the for-
mer but not the latter [36].
It is well-established that OFC activity responds not only
to received outcomes, but also to cues that serve to
predict such outcomes [37,38] A recent neuroimaging
study [39] used a probabilistic task to examine reward
value (actual received reward) and expected payoff
(average expected reward), finding that both expectedPlease cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
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value and payoff modulate the same area of OFC. Two
components that are essential to valuing predicted out-
comes are (1) the probability of occurrence and (2) how
far in the future it is expected. A representation of
abstract expected value would imply that these distinct
components of value (expected time and reward magni-
tude/probability) are appropriately combined. Interest-
ingly, however, Roesch et al. [16] found single neurons in
rat OFC whose activity correlated with both reward
delays and sizes independently but not jointly, a result
which contrasts with a previous study in monkeys [40].
Expected value signals should also vary inversely with
uncertainty. Kepecs et al. [41], by manipulating decision
difficulty in a deterministically rewarded categorization
task, found that rat OFC neurons can predict outcome
probability before receipt. The authors reported two
classes of OFC neurons, one whose firing increased with
uncertainty and one whose value decreased; the results
are discussed in more detail below. In a task where
amount, cost and probability were manipulated indepen-
dently in a single experiment, Kennerley et al. [42] found
single neurons in monkey OFC that were modulated by
one, two and all three factors, but less commonly than in
medial prefrontal cortex.
Although it is evident from these findings that OFC
neurons participate in predictive representations of out-
comes that incorporate both delays and probabilities, the
findings leavemuch unclear about how these variables are
represented within the population of OFC neurons. One
interesting possibility that is consistent with the available
data, although still speculative, is that predicted outcomes
are represented using a probabilistic form of population
code, as proposed for other brain areas [43,44]. Indeed,
there is evidence from neuroimaging that OFC predicts
not just expected outcomes (the probability weighted
sum of different possible outcomes), but the variance
of outcomes as well, sometimes known as ‘risk’ [33,45–
47]. Recordings from rat OFC are consistent with a
population code for reward value predictions [59]. If
OFC neurons are using a probabilistic population code,
in which not just the mean estimated outcome, but the
full probability distribution of expected outcomes is
represented, then both mean and variance of the outcome
would be represented simultaneously in the same popu-
lation of neurons [44].
Computing outcome predictions using
reinforcement learning
We have considered in some detail the properties of
neural representations of outcomes or predicted out-
comes in OFC. Along with this question of representation
comes the question of how these representations, particu-
larly the predictive ones, are generated. In particular,
what algorithms can be used to obtain accurate predic-
tions of outcomes? Reinforcement learning (RL) theory
provides a normative framework for how to predict andcomes in the orbitofrontal cortex, Curr Opin Neurobiol (2009), doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.03.010
www.sciencedirect.com
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Figure 2
Multiple mechanisms for outcome predictions. Illustration of two
mechanisms for generating outcome predictions. (a) In reinforcement
learning, the history of past trial outcomes (gray horizontal shading) can
be used to predict (arrow) the expected outcome of the current trial
(question mark). The expected value on each trial is a weighted sum of
previous outcomes (red bars). This prediction mechanism is useful when
there is a probabilistic predictive relationship between previous and
current outcomes. In such situations the appropriate use of past history
can average out stochasticity and provide good outcome predictions. (b)
In decision tasks, outcomes can be probabilistic because of limitations
or noise in sensory, memory or decision processes. In such situations
the most important source of information about the expected outcome is
the data on which the decision is based. Therefore, a measurement of
the uncertainty of the decision variables (blue and green squares, with
size indicating quantity) on the current trial (gray vertical box) can yield a
decision confidence estimate that predicts (arrow) the probability of a
correct decision (blue-green bars). The relevant decision variables will be
different for each kind of decision process, such as sensory and memory
variables need for a categorization process. If a correct decision implies
reward, such a decision confidence estimate will be a useful predictor of
expected reward value as well. For details, see Ref. [42].UN
CO
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obtain maximal values using a two-part procedure: first,
learn the values of states (roughly, stimuli) and/or actions;
second, select actions in order to maximize predicted
future values [7]. The RL framework provides precise
normative algorithms for both steps. As parts of these
algorithms, there exist abstract variables – including the
‘predicted reward value’ and ‘reward value prediction
error’ – that can be specified in terms of the history of
past stimuli (states), actions and outcomes. By fitting RL
models to directly observable behavioral data, one can
thus test how well any of these internal variables can
predict patterns of behavioral choices or neural activity
[48], especially during dynamic situations in which the
outcomes themselves or contingencies between stimuli,
actions and outcomes vary probabilistically.
Several groups have appliedRLmodel-based approaches
to recordings of single neurons in areas including parietal
cortex [49,50], striatum [51,52] and prefrontal cortex [53].
What is clear from these studies is that correlates of value
and related variables, as defined formally in RL, can be
found throughout a distributed network of brain areas,
including the OFC. The ubiquity of value signals
throughout the brain should not obscure the fact that
in most cases these do not appear to represent ‘pure
value’ in a neuroeconomic sense, but rather appear to
scale different kinds of sensory or motor representations.
However, signals that apparently encode value may also
reflect related but computationally distinct variables.
Thus, an overarching question is how different variables
might be parcellated amongst various brain regions, a
task made trickier by the fact that different RL variables
are strongly correlated in many tasks. Hare et al. [54], in a
recent neuroimaging study, used a task design that
allowed them to orthogonalize several related variables.
They found that signals in OFC were more closely
related to value predictions than to prediction errors.
Although model-based approaches have not been
applied to single neuron OFC recordings, Takahashi
et al. (Schoenbaum, in press) used a paradigm with a
switch in reward values to test for correlates of value
predictions and value prediction errors in OFC. The
findings also suggested that OFC encodes value signals
but not value error signals. If this is true, then it inter-
esting that OFC neurons encode both the predicted and
the actual received outcomes, but do not subtract these
signals to produce the prediction error signal that is used
for learning, instead leaving this job to dopamine neurons
and other areas.
Although reinforcement learning provides an attractive
framework for understanding important aspects of OFC
function, other aspects remain more challenging. It is
known that in environments with complex predictive
relationships, OFC neurons are sensitive to these vari-
ables [55]. A recent study in monkey OFC demonstrated
that OFC neurons do not only signal anticipate rewardsPlease cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
www.sciencedirect.comOO
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across trials, but alsomaintain a representation of past trial
events, with the activity of individual neurons actively
retaining information about rewards from one trial to the
next [56]. Whereas associative learning mechanisms
might act within OFC to generate predictive representa-
tions, other forms of outcome prediction appear to require
the OFC to work closely with other brain regions. For
example, the ability of OFC neurons to predict successive
elements of a sequence depends on an intact hippo-
campus [57]
Computing outcome predictions using
confidence estimates
The outcome value predictions considered in the
reinforcement-learning framework above are generated
by learning from experience. In principle, outcome pre-comes in the orbitofrontal cortex, Curr Opin Neurobiol (2009), doi:10.1016/j.conb.2009.03.010
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2009, 19:1–7
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dictions can be generated by other mechanisms. In many
situations, a behavioral outcome depends on a decision
that is subject to uncertainty arising from subjective
limitations, such as imperfect perception or memory. In
such a case, if the decision-maker can assess the quality of
the internal representation on which a particular decision
is based, this assessment can provide predictive infor-
mation above and beyond what could be gleaned from
past experience.
This process, known as confidence estimation, was
examined by Kepecs et al. [41] using a categorization
task in which outcomes were deterministic, but decision
difficulty could be manipulated by varying the distance of
stimuli to the category boundary. The authors showed
that using both a standard signal detection theory and an
evidence integration-based decision model, it was simple
to compute a measure of decision confidence that pro-
vided a good estimate of the expected outcome using only
information available in the current trial (Figure 2).
Remarkably, during outcome anticipation the firing of
one third of rat OFC neurons showed the selectivity
predicted by such models, a pattern that could not be
explained by predictions based on learning from past trial
outcomes.
These data suggest that OFC generates outcome pre-
dictions not only through reinforcement learning but
also by directly accessing internal or subjective infor-
mation generated during the decision process [41]. By
using information derived from internal representa-
tions, confidence estimation provides additional means
to predict outcomes that is not available through
externally observable stimulus-outcome associations.
These observations are consistent with the general
view that OFC representations concern outcome expec-
tations, but establish a novel means for generating
these expectations. It remains to be determined how
confidence signals relate to other aspects of OFC
representations. In particular, it will be important to
determine whether the same neurons that are modu-
lated by confidence are also modulated by other facets
of expected value.
Conclusions
In this review we have emphasized recent progress and
open questions in the function of the OFC from a
computational perspective. Much evidence points to
OFC as representing the ends or outcomes that
motivate goal-directed behavior but much remains
to be done to flesh out how these highly abstract
entities are represented and computed at the level of
individual neurons. We suggest that thinking more
about how OFC represents information and the algor-
ithms with which it generates and manipulates these
representations will lead to more precise design and
interpretation of experiments and ultimately a betterPlease cite this article in press as: Mainen ZF, Kepecs A. Neural representation of behavioral out
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understanding of how OFC performs its extremely
interesting job.
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